Beyond the ‘<i>Tomlinson</i> Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 by Partington, Neil
Beyond the ‘Tomlinson Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of
Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006
Partington, N. (2016). Beyond the ‘Tomlinson Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the
Compensation Act 2006. Liverpool Law Review. DOI: 10.1007/s10991-016-9180-4
Published in:
Liverpool Law Review
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
The Author 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
Beyond the ‘Tomlinson Trap’: Analysing
the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act
2006
Neil Partington1
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract One of the intentions underpinning section 1 of the Compensation Act
2006 was to provide reassurance to individual volunteers, and voluntary organisa-
tions, involved in what the provision called ‘desirable activities’ and including
sport. The perception was that such volunteers, motivated by an apprehension about
their increased vulnerability to negligence liability, and as driven by a fear of a
wider societal compensation culture, were engaging excessively in risk-averse
behaviour to the detriment of such socially desirable activities. Academic com-
mentary on section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 has largely regarded the pro-
vision as unnecessary and doing little more than restating existing common law
practice. This article argues otherwise and, on critically reviewing the emerging
jurisprudence, posits the alternative view that section 1, in practice, affords an
enhanced level of protection and safeguarding for individuals undertaking functions
in connection with a desirable activity. Nonetheless, the occasionally idiosyncratic
judicial interpretation given to term ‘desirable activity’, potentially compounded by
recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015,
remains problematic. Two points of interest will be used to inform this debate. First,
an analysis of the then House of Lords’ decision in Tomlinson and its celebrated
‘balancing exercise’ when assessing reasonableness in the context of negligence
liability. Second, a fuller analysis of the application of section 1 in the specific
context of negligence actions relating to the coaching of sport where it is argued that
the, albeit limited, jurisprudence might support the practical utility of a heightened
evidential threshold of gross negligence.
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Introduction
It is the function of the law of tort to deter negligent conduct and to
compensate those who are the victims of such conduct. It is not the function of
the law of tort to eliminate every iota of risk or to stamp out socially desirable
activities …. This principle is now enshrined in section 1 of the Compensation
Act 2006. … However, the principle has always been part of the common
law.1
Introduction of section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 (the Act) in England and
Wales has been the subject of considerable judicial and academic criticism,2 it being
widely regarded as ‘an unnecessary solution to a non-existent problem’.3
Significantly, critical scrutiny of the emerging jurisprudence, whereby section 1
has been engaged, lends some support to the alternative view that section 1, in
practice, affords an enhanced level of protection and safeguarding for individuals
undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. By explicitly
concentrating the court’s attention on the necessary Tomlinson balancing exercise
when assessing reasonableness in the specific circumstances,4 section 1 minimises
the danger of courts succumbing to the ‘Tomlinson trap’, this representing a failure
to fully account for ‘the social value of the activity giving rise to the risk and the
cost of the preventative measures’.5 Nonetheless, the idiosyncratic judicial
interpretation of the weight to be afforded to ‘desirable activity’, and tort law’s
sometimes blunt and unpredictable assessment of breach, remain problematic,
thereby reinforcing the essentially limited scope of section 1. Accordingly, in
critically considering the application of section 1 in the specific context of sports
coaching, this article endorses the meaningfulness of a gross negligence standard, a
modified standard of care appearing desirable in circumstances where volunteers are
operating to promote socially valuable activities.6 In short, this article submits that
the general tenor of section 1, despite safeguarding against the ‘Tomlinson trap’,
might more effectively be achieved through complementary civil liability immunity
legislation. Further, recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility and
Heroism Act 2015 (SARAH Act) by the UK Parliament will be contended to signify
a missed opportunity to provide meaningful reassurance to persons acting for the
benefit of society.
The article begins by considering the scope of section 1 of the Act. Fundamen-
tally, to avail of this provision, defendants must be functioning to promote a
1 Scout Association v Barnes [2010] EWCA Civ 1476 [34] (Jackson LJ).
2 See, for example, Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller [2012] EWHC 1777(QB) [42], [43], [46] (Owen J); A Morris,
‘Spiralling or Stabilising? The Compensation Culture and Our Propensity to Claim Damages for Personal
Injury’ (2007) 70 Mod L Rev 349, 368.
3 K Williams, ‘Legislating in the echo chamber?’ (2005) 155 New Law Journal 1938.
4 Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47. Also see, SF Deakin et al., Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort
Law (7th ed., OUP, 2013) 273.
5 Scout Association (n 1) [59] (Ward LJ). Also see, Tomlinson (n 4) [42] (Lord Hoffmann).
6 See generally, D Nolan, ‘Varying The Standard Of Care In Negligence’ (2013) 73(3) Camb Law J 651,
673.
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desirable activity, the developing case law clarifying what might be regarded as a
desirable activity by the English courts. Having addressed these preliminary issues,
this article next analyses the limitations of section 1, critical scrutiny of the
emerging jurisprudence revealing important discrepancies in judicial reasoning
when section 1 has been engaged. Section 1’s capacity to erode the legal principle
of objective reasonableness, by facilitating variable standards of care, is then
exposed. Following this general analysis, a detailed examination of Scout
Association v Barnes7 proves decidedly illuminating. Careful review and reflection
of Ward LJ’s judgment heightens appreciation and awareness of the ‘Tomlinson
trap’. This will be argued to be the predominant benefit of section 1, with recent first
instance judgments seemingly more mindful of the need to recognise and explicitly
account for the social value of the activity giving rise to the risk.8 Ultimately, the
special circumstances of sports coaching provides a quintessential context in which
to assess the usefulness of section 1, indicating the combined effectiveness of
section 1 with a gross negligence standard.
Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006
The principal purpose of section 1 of the Act is to incorporate the significant dicta
expressed in the House of Lords’ judgments in Tomlinson v Congleton BC9 into
statute,10 thereby drawing attention to, and expounding, this common law
principle.11 Section 1, in attempting to address risk-averse behaviour fueled by a
perceived ‘compensation culture’,12 stipulates under the pertinent head of ‘Deterrent
effect of potential liability’ that:
A court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in
determining whether the defendant should have taken particular steps to meet
a standard of care (whether by taking precautions against a risk or otherwise),
have regard to whether a requirement to take those steps might—
prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent
or in a particular way, or
discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable
activity.13
7 Scout Association (n 1).
8 See, for example, Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Limited [2012] EWHC 2360 (QB) [45], [52], [56],
[60]; Wilkin-Shaw (n 2) [41]–[46].
9 See Tomlinson (n 4) [34], [47], [48] (Lord Hoffmann); [81] (Lord Hobhouse); [94] (Lord Scott).
10 R Herbert, ‘The Compensation Act 2006’ (2006) 4 JPI Law 337; UK Parliament, ‘Social Action,
Responsibility and Heroism Bill’ (HC Library Research Paper s 14/38, 2014) 8 http://www.parliament.uk/
briefing-papers/RP14-38/social-action-responsibility-and-heroism-bill. Last accessed 12 February 2016.
11 Hopps v Mott MacDonald Ltd [2009] EWHC 1881 (QB) [92] (Clarke J).
12 See Morris (n 2) 350; R Lewis et al, ‘Tort personal injury claims statistics: is there a compensation
culture in the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 2 JPI Law 87, 102.
13 Compensation Act 2006, s 1.
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Further, in order to assist a better understanding of the Act, the accompanying
Explanatory Notes prepared by the Department for Constitutional Affairs provide
that section 1:
[I]s intended to contribute to improving awareness of this aspect of the law;
providing reassurance to the people and organisations who are concerned
about possible litigation; and to ensuring that normal activities are not
prevented because of the fear of litigation and excessively risk-averse
behaviour.
[I]s not concerned with and does not alter the standard of care, nor the
circumstances in which a duty to take that care will be owed. It is solely
concerned with the court’s assessment of what constitutes reasonable care in
the case before it.
[R]eflects the existing law and approach of the courts as expressed in recent
judgments of the higher courts.14
Intuitively, the individuals stereotypically associated with facilitating, organising
and delivering desirable activities are unpaid volunteers. Indeed, a particular
intention of the Labour Government when introducing section 1 was to reassure
voluntary organisations.15 More recently, this assumption may have been reinforced
by Lord Young’s report, ‘Common Sense, Common Safety’,16 specific reference to
promoting and encouraging ‘Voluntary activities’ being more pronounced, the
intention being to prevent ‘an overcautious approach when assessing risk, which
sometimes results in the curtailment of worthwhile activities’.17 Legislation
restricting civil liability in other jurisdictions specifically recognises and safeguards
the volunteer.18 Nonetheless, in England and Wales, the Act’s provision, although
perhaps ultimately affording enhanced judicial leniency towards the functions of
volunteers,19 is not so restricted in its application. Although somewhat of a
preliminary issue, this observation is one of some importance, it possibly offering
some insight into instances where section 1 was surprisingly not mentioned by
defendants.20 Significantly, section 1 has been engaged in a number of recent Court
14 Explanatory Notes to the Compensation Act 2006, [10], [11], [17] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2006/29/notes. Accessed 19 May 2016.
15 A Morris, ‘‘‘Common sense common safety’’: the compensation culture perspective’ (2011) 27(2)
Professional Negligence 82, 92.
16 Lord Young of Graffham, Common Sense Common Safety (October 2010) https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60905/402906_CommonSense_acc.pdf. Acces-
sed 5 May 2016.
17 Ibid 29.
18 See, for example, Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 (Republic of Ireland); Volunteer
Protection Act 1997 (USA); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Queensland, Australia).
19 Discussed later.
20 E.g., Wilson v Haden [2013] EWHC 229 (QB); MacIntyre v MoD [2011] EWHC 1690 (QB); Anderson
v Lyotier [2008] EWHC 2790 (QB); Radclyffe v MoD [2009] EWCA Civ 635 (QB): see further, K.
O’Sullivan, ‘Climb every mountain….’ (2011) 161 New Law Journal 1095.
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of Appeal,21 and High Court judgments,22 enabling critical scrutiny of its impact to
date, and dismissing any possible assumption that this provision is intended to
protect solely volunteers. Nevertheless, this article will primarily analyse sec-
tion 1’s applicability to socially desirable activities delivered by volunteers, the
likely impact of section 1 on the emerging juridification of sports coaching and
instructing23 being of particular emphasis.24
What is a ‘Desirable Activity’?
Since the Act offers no definition of what constitutes a ‘desirable activity’, as a
statutory restatement of the common law position following Tomlinson, it may be
presumed to be the same as Lord Hoffmann’s reference to ‘social utility’.25
Nonetheless, arguments indicating that the meaning of socially desirable activity
would potentially be wider than social utility26 have been confirmed by the
emerging jurisprudence. Indeed, initial academic commentary expecting most
recognised sports to be regarded as desirable activities has been affirmed.27 From
the outset, in drawing attention to, and expounding, the Tomlinson principle in
Hopps v Mott MacDonald Ltd,28 Clarke J adopted a wide interpretation, regarding
the ‘reconstruction of a shattered infrastructure after a war in a territory occupied by
HM forces’ as a desirable activity.29 Subsequently, many physical recreations,
including, for example, rugby, cricket or skiing, have been endorsed by the judiciary
as having a recognised social value,30 with games ‘obviously desirable activities
within the meaning of section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006’.31
More generally, RAF Health and Fun Days, with ‘It’s a Knock-Out’ style
games32; fun activities organised as part of an away day (afternoon) by employers
21 Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 66; Scout Association (n 1); Sutton v Syston
RFC Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 1182; Humphrey v Aegis Defence Services Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 11.
22 Hopps, (n 11); Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 46 (QB); Uren v Corporate
Leisure (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 353 (QB); Wilkin-Shaw (n 2); Blair-Ford (n 8); Humphrey v Aegis
Defence Services Ltd [2014] EWHC 989 (QB).
23 See generally, M James, Sports Law (2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 69–70.
24 See, for example, the recent cases of Anderson (n 20); Davenport v Farrow [2010] EWHC 550 (QB);
Morrow v Dungannon and South Tyrone BC [2012] NIQB 50; Cox v Dundee CC [2014] CSOH 3. Cases
involving PE teachers are also indicative of this emerging juridification e.g., Hammersley-Gonsalves v
Redcar and Cleveland BC [2012] EWCA Civ 1135. See further, N. Partington, ‘Legal liability of
coaches: a UK perspective’ (2014) 14(3–4) International Sports Law Journal 232.
25 MA Jones and AM Dugdale (eds), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (20th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2010)
[8–161].
26 Ibid.
27 See, for example, B. Gardiner, ‘Liability for sporting injuries’ (2008) 1 JPI Law 16, 19.
28 Hopps (n 11).
29 Ibid [92]–[93]. Also see, Humphrey (n 22) [113].
30 Scout Association (n 1) [29].
31 Sutton (n 21) [13] (Longmore LJ).
32 See, for example, Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 353 (QB).
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for employees33; the activities of the scout movement34; the challenges of an
efficient and professionally run outdoor pursuits centre35; practising for a nativity
play or taking part in choir practice36; and the training of school children, aged
between 14 and 19, for the Ten Tors Expedition on Dartmoor,37 have all engaged
section 1 of the Act by being recognised as socially desirable activities in the case
law. By engaging section 1, persons functioning in connection with these types of
activities, if sued, might expect the court to be mindful of the wider implications of
judgments. Specifically, determination of the standard of care required in the
circumstances of individual cases may be shaped by judicial reluctance to
discourage other persons from undertaking similar functions or prevent/limit the
undertaking of the same desirable activity. For instance, should a sports coach be
sued in negligence for participant injury, a developing issue38 and concern39 facing
modern coaches, since the functions of the coach would likely be regarded as being
connected with the promotion of a desirable activity, section 1 should be applicable.
Accordingly, this article will critically consider if section 1 may be of assistance to
defendants in this context. To more effectively facilitate this detailed analysis, the
implications of section 1 of the Act must first be examined more generally.
Limitations of Section 1
Since section 1 merely reflects the existing common law,40 as rehearsed in
Tomlinson, there appears much force to the contention that the well-established
components of the negligence calculus render section 1’s provision redundant.41
Accordingly, ‘[a]lthough s.1 purports to enable the courts to shift the balance of the
assessment of negligence towards defendants, the reality is that it adds nothing of
substance to the way in which the courts have, for many years, determined
whether a defendant is in breach of duty’.42 More fundamentally, Charlesworth
and Percy on Negligence question the merits of interference by Parliament ‘into
an area of the common law with several hundred years of development and
33 Reynolds v Strutt [2011] EWHC 2263 (QB).
34 Scout Association (n 1).
35 Blair-Ford (n 8).
36 McErlean v MacAuley [2014] NIQB 1.
37 Wilkin-Shaw (n 2).
38 Partington (n 24); AS McCaskey and KW Biedzynski, ‘A Guide to the Legal Liability of Coaches for a
Sports Participant’s Injuries’ (1996) 6 Seton Hall J Sport L 7.
39 S Greenfield, ‘Law’s impact on youth sport: should coaches be ‘‘concerned about litigation’’?’ (2013)
2(2) Sports Coaching Review 114, 121.
40 Ministry of Justice, Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee: Post-Legislative Assessment of the
Compensation Act 2006 (January 2012) [62].
41 K Williams, ‘Politics, the media and refining the notion of fault: section 1 of the Compensation Act
2006’ (2006) 4 JPI Law 347, 351–52.
42 Jones and Dugdale (n 25) [8–162].
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decided cases’.43 Indeed, superficially, section 1 appears to be a somewhat blunt
and ineffective means of reinforcing the government’s message that good risk
taking is desirable.44 Interestingly, the SARAH Act, since its provisions do not
change the overarching framework of the law of negligence,45 appears peculiarly
exposed to these same distinctive reservations.46
Challenging perceptions about what constitutes negligence, and improving
society’s awareness and understanding of the tort of negligence, the issue that
section 1 is intended to address,47 would be more effectively tackled through
educating individuals involved in managing risk.48 For instance, clarification of
what may be regarded as a suitable and sufficient assessment of risk, given the
increased judicial scrutiny of this aspect of risk management,49 would be of
assistance in defining ‘acceptable’ risk when undertaking particular activities in the
specific circumstances.50 Enhancing competence and confidence levels in conduct-
ing sensible risk assessments, through effective training designed to reassure
individuals, would likely encourage the organisation of more desirable activities.51
Nonetheless, despite section 1 being crafted to encourage and safeguard persons
functioning to promote desirable activities, by seeking to challenge excessive risk-
averse behaviour, it is doubtful that the unusual legislative strategy of codifying the
existing common law will result in any changing of attitudes.52 The provision
appears inadequate to combat excessively cautious or defensive actions, the so-
called overkill argument, which may lead to a chilling effect whereby potential
defendants curtail their activities altogether.53 In short, section 1 seems ill-equipped
to address misperceptions and excessive risk aversion since it fails to respond to the
insufficient awareness or understanding of negligence law by organisers of local
events and activities.54 Although it would appear that section 1 may be regarded as
43 C Walton (ed), Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) [7.37]. Also
see, Wilkin-Shaw (n 2) [43] (Owen J).
44 J Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd ed., OUP, 2010) 139.
45 Explanatory Notes to the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, [5].
46 N Partington, ‘What Does The Social Action, Responsibility & Heroism Act 2015 Mean For Sports
Volunteers And NGBs?’ LawInSport, 3 April 2015 http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/what-the-
new-social-action-responsibility-heroism-act-2015-means-for-sports-volunteers-and-ngbs. Accessed 11
February 2016.
47 Ministry of Justice, Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee: Post-Legislative Assessment of the
Compensation Act 2006 (January 2012) [61].
48 D Kitchener, ‘The Compensation Bill, clause 1- an undesirable deterrent?’ (2005) 155 New Law
Journal 1793.
49 See, for example, Uren (n 21) [41]–[42], Smith LJ stating ‘[s]ometimes the failure to undertake a
proper risk assessment can affect or even determine the outcome of a claim and judges must be alive to
that and not sweep it aside … In any event, risk assessments are an important feature of the health and
safety landscape. At their best, they can provide an opportunity for intelligent and well-informed
appraisal of risk and can form a blueprint for action leading to improved safety standards’.
50 Ibid [76] (Aikens LJ).
51 Kitchener (n 48).
52 Williams (n 41) 351.
53 Nolan (n 6) 686.
54 Morris (n 2) 368.
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having no real substance, importantly, the developing case law in which section 1
has been engaged allows critical scrutiny of whether in practice it may actually be
regarded as a tacit invitation for courts to heighten the breach barrier.55
Contemporary Jurisprudence
Reservations concerning the utility and appropriateness of section 1 have been
convincingly articulated in Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller by Owen J:
This section appears to have been introduced as a response to the perception of
the growth of a ‘compensation culture’. The draft bill was produced by the
Department of Constitutional Affairs, and was accompanied by explanatory
notes that asserted that section 1 did no more than ‘‘reflect the existing law’’.
In that case it is somewhat difficult to see why it was felt necessary to enact it,
and why, as enacted, it was couched in discretionary terms.56
Simply applied, a permissive, not mandatory, provision that restates the existing
common law position would appear to have little scope for safeguarding and protecting
individuals and associations,57 thereby ensuring that persons are not discouraged from
undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. Similar sentiments
endorsing the view that section 1 does not alter or extend the common law position in
any way have been echoed by a number of Court of Appeal and High Court judges in
several recent judgments,58 most notably Smith LJ.59 Indeed, her Ladyship further
clarified and refined the legal test of balancing the social value of an activity with the
magnitude of risk involved, or Tomlinson inquiry, when stating:
Of course, the law of tort must not interfere with activities just because they
carry some risk. Of course, the law of tort must not stamp out socially
desirable activities. But whether the social benefit of an activity is such that
the degree of risk it entails is acceptable is a question of fact, degree and
judgment, which must be decided on an individual basis and not by a broad
brush approach.60
Arguably, this further dilutes the impact and reach of section 1 by creating an
additional degree of uncertainty. Even once an activity may be regarded as
‘desirable’ and thereby engage section 1, determining whether the social benefit of
any activity is such that the degree of risk that it entails is acceptable remains
dependent on the individual case. Consequently, application of section 1 appears
55 Williams (n 41) 352–53.
56 Wilkin-Shaw (n 2) [42]. Also see [46].
57 Deakin et al. (n 4) 214.
58 Scout Association (n 1) [34]–[35] (Jackson LJ); Sutton (n 21) [13] (Longmore LJ); Uren v Corporate
Leisure (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 46 [19] (Field J); McErlean (n 36) [12] (Horner J); Humphrey (n 22)
[112] (HHJ Bidder). The approach of the Court of Appeal in Humphrey (n 21) also supports this view.
59 Uren (n 21) [13]; Scout Association (n 1) [36], [49].
60 Scout Association (n 1) [49], cited with approval in Wilkin-Shaw (n 2) [46] (Owen J).
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reliant on the trial judge’s subjective notion of acceptable risk taking.61 Since what
determines whether the social benefits of an activity justify the associated degree of
risk created by the defendant’s conduct is a question of fact, degree and judgment,
the idiosyncratic judicial sensitivity and tenderness afforded to socially desirable
activities is likely to prove inconsistent and problematic, discrepancies having
already been revealed in the case law.
When Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Limited62 was initially heard at first
instance, the ‘It’s a Knockout’ type relay race in which the claimant was seriously
injured, involving an inflatable pool and, part of an RAF Health and Fun day, was
described by Field J as ‘an enjoyable game, in part because of the physical
challenges it posed to contestants. The risk of serious injury was small. In my
judgement, neither CL nor the MOD, was obliged to neuter the game of much of its
enjoyable challenge by prohibiting head first entry’.63 In contrast, when considered
by the Court of Appeal, Smith LJ made clear that she ‘personally would not have
assessed the social value of this game in quite such glowing terms as did the
judge’.64 Conversely, when conducting the re-trial, Foskett J’s sensitivity and regard
for the socially desirable merits of the particular activity, and importantly, an
awareness and appreciation of the wider implications for activities that may be
regarded as socially valuable, generated a more glowing assessment of the social
value of the game than Field J. Foskett J highlighted that:
The focus of the question is upon the particular game in which the Claimant
was injured. I will, of course, address that, but it does seem to me that the issue
needs to be seen in a slightly wider context. As to that wider context, I would
think that there would be no disagreement from any quarter: it is that an event
such as the event in which this tragic accident occurred is of great social
value, not just in a Services setting, as this one was, but in other settings too.
Whilst not every individual might enjoy every aspect of a ‘‘Fun day’’, there is
undoubtedly an opportunity on such an occasion for fun and laughter, often at
the expense of others, for letting go and losing inhibitions and bonding with
other colleagues, friends and possibly strangers in a light-hearted, but
competitive setting. Since the day with which this case is concerned was in a
Services setting, the value is enhanced in a number of ways.65
In short, the setting of the standard of care for defendants delivering or organising
an activity of ‘great social value’, ‘immense social value’,66 or viewed as ‘obviously
61 As recently noted by Lord Dyson MR, the behaviour of judges can be unpredictable, see: ‘Magna
Carta and Compensation Culture’, The High Sheriff of Oxfordshire’s Annual Law Lecture, 13 October
2015, [39] https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/high-sheriffs-speech.pdf. Accessed
12 February 2016.
62 Uren (n 58).
63 Ibid [59].
64 Uren (n 21) [69] (Smith LJ).
65 Uren (n 32) [195] (emphasis added).
66 Blair-Ford (n 8) [60] (Globe J).
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desirable’,67 may justifiably be less demanding than an equivalent activity regarded
by the court as merely ‘a source of fun’.68 This seems reasonable. Nonetheless, there
appears considerable difficulty and uncertainty in the weight attached to desirable
activities by the courts. Arguably, some judges may be responding to section 1’s
tacit invitation to heighten the breach barrier in the affirmative. Others in the
negative. This distinctive judicial interpretation is problematic.
Variable Standards of Care
Fundamentally, it is submitted that the application of section 1 may result in
variable standards of care, which have not been well received in this jurisdiction,69
further eroding the reasonable person standard.70 A simple illustration of the scope
for this shift away from the benchmark of objective reasonableness can be drawn
from consideration of a leading authority for co-participant liability in sport,
Condon v Basi.71 In delivering the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Condon, Sir John
Donaldson MR stated ‘there will of course be a higher degree of care required of a
player in a First Division football match than of a player in a local league football
match’.72 By analogy, it appears feasible that in a cup match between, for instance, a
professional team and an amateur team, should the coaches advocate the targeting of
opposing players,73 or psychologically over-arouse athletes,74 in determining
whether either coach may have breached their duty of care, the social utility of their
respective roles may result in variable standards of care in the same
circumstances. Should the coach of the amateur team be an unpaid volunteer,
the enhanced social desirability of such volunteering would likely encourage more
judicial tenderness in defining reasonable care in the circumstances than what
might be afforded to the opposing professional coach.75 Put simply, in light of
67 Sutton (n 21) [13] (Longmore LJ).
68 Risk v Rose Bruford College [2013] EWHC 3869 (QB) [66] (Jay J), addressing the social utility issue
raised in Tomlinson.
69 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 (CA); MJ Beloff et al, Sports Law (2nd ed., Hart, 2012) 143.
70 Nolan (n 6) 652.
71 (1985) 2 All ER 453. Also see, Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054. Importantly,
consideration of the prevailing circumstances enables the court to distinguish between the expression of
legal principle (objective reasonableness) and the practicalities of the evidential burden of ‘reckless
disregard’. See further, D McArdle and M James, ‘Are you experienced? ‘‘Playing cultures’’, sporting
rules and personal injury litigation after Caldwell v Maguire’ (2005) 13(3) Tort Law Review 193.
72 Condon (n 71) 454.
73 See, for example, A Epstein, Sports Law (South-Western Cengage Learning, 2013) 137; G Wong,
Essentials of Sports Law (4th ed., Praeger, 2010) 123.
74 Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Rogers [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81–246.
Interestingly, with reference to sport psychology, the distinction between optimal arousal and over-
arousal can be highly individualistic and finely balanced.
75 The assumption in this scenario being that but for the volunteer coach, amateur players from the (local)
community may have reduced opportunities for sporting involvement. Conversely, the objectives of the
professional coach would be unlikely to prioritise ‘grassroots’ participation to the same extent.
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section 1,76 the altruistic behaviour of the volunteer coach is a material
consideration. This poses the significant issue of whether there may be a more
principled and effective means of safeguarding volunteers from civil liability than
section 1 of the Act, by more clearly establishing ‘the nature and scope of the
duty of care and the precautions a person must take to meet the standard of care
required by the law as it stands’.77 Since determining the required standard of care
in all of the circumstances is far from predictable,78 section 1 remains ineffective
in addressing the age old problem of predicting conduct deemed ‘negligent’.79
Further important limitations of the application of section 1 have recently been
uncovered in Scout Association v Barnes.
Scout Association v Barnes
Section 1’s serious limitations in achieving the intended objective of safeguarding,
reassuring, and ultimately encouraging volunteers to undertake functions in
connection with a desirable activity were exposed in Scout Association v Barnes.80
In Scout Association v Barnes, the claimant was aged 13 at the time of the accident,
which happened during a game of ‘Objects in the Dark’81 at a Castle Bromwich
scout meeting. For present purposes, the determining legal issue was whether the
supervising scout leaders had breached the duty of care owed to the claimant by
playing the game with the lights off in circumstances which involved a competitive
game involving 13-year old boys running around in an enclosed space. At first
instance, Judge Worster, in finding the Scout Association vicariously liable for the
actions of its agents, ruled that ‘in all the circumstances it seems to me there is a
breach here; the game played in the dark is dangerous—dangerous to the extent that
there is a breach of the duty to take reasonable care. That breach of duty caused the
injury in this case, an injury for which I find the Defendant is liable’.82 Given the
potentially wider implications of this decision for an association with 500,000
members aged between six and eighteen, and 100,000 voluntary scout leaders, the
Scout Association appealed this judgment.
76 Perceived exposure to negligence liability would appear to be considerably less likely to interfere with,
and discourage, the functions of an employed coach. For instance, a professional coach would be
expected to have appropriate insurance indemnity and also be able to shift liability to the employer
(vicarious liability), in circumstances where the coach is acting in the capacity of employee: see, James (n
23) 81. See further, J Anderson, ‘Personal Injury Liability in Sport: Emerging Trends’ (2008) 16 Tort Law
Review 95, 112–13.
77 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers (LRC 93,
2009) [3.106].
78 N Dobson, ‘Accidents do happen’ (2008) 4 JPI Law 258, 259.
79 Morris (n 15) 92–93. The SARAH Act, despite being couched in mandatory terms, will be argued to
appear equally ineffective in this regard.
80 Scout Association (n 1).
81 Ibid [7]. When the lights were turned out completely, the scouts jogging around the outside of the hall
had to rush to grab a block from the centre of the hall. In each round there would be one less block than
participant. Whichever boy failed to grab a block would be eliminated until there would eventually be one
winner. When the main lights were turned off, the hall was not in pitch darkness.
82 Ibid [18].
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The Court of Appeal recognised that the law of tort must not interfere with
activities just because they carry some risk,83 and importantly, the valuable
contribution made to society by the Scouting Association.84 Section 1 of the Act
was firmly engaged. Nonetheless, Smith and Ward LJJ endorsed the approach of
Judge Worster, when balancing the risk with the social value of the activity and the
cost of preventative measures, finding that playing the activity in ‘darkness did not
add any other social or educative value but it did significantly increase the risk of
injury’.85 In his strong dissenting judgment, Jackson LJ stated:
Obviously the risks of this particular game were increased by turning off the
main lights. But I do not see how it could possibly be said that these increased
risks outweighed the social benefits of the activity. Children and teenagers
have played games with an element of risk, including games in the dark, since
time immemorial. The game played by the claimant and his fellow scouts on
14th February 2001 was much safer than many games which children might
play, if left to their own devices. It was properly supervised by three
experienced adults. It was structured. It was a game which has been played on
many occasions before and since that date without mishap. It is the sort of
activity which attracts young people to join or remain in the scouts. In my
view, it cannot possibly be said that there was a failure to exercise reasonable
care by the scout leader and the assistant leaders.86
This reasoning seems difficult to fault. A socially desirable activity: structured;
supervised; much safer than many games that children might play if left
unoccupied; played previously on many occasions without injury; and a means of
recruiting and retaining scout members. Nonetheless, consideration of the wider
social context seems somewhat rhetorical, the force of Jackson LJ’s entirely sensible
dissenting opinion essentially tempered and nullified by the law of negligence’s
necessity to focus on the social value of the particular activity, rather than the social
value of scouting activities as a whole.87 As the Explanatory Notes make clear,
section 1 is exclusively concerned with the court’s assessment of what represents
reasonable care in the specific case before it.88 By discounting a more ‘broad brush
approach’,89 the decision of the majority in Scout Association v Barnes appears to
be underpinned by a primarily ‘marginal analysis’ of precaution-taking,90 ultimately
focusing on the particular mitigation of risk to the exclusion of more general
83 Ibid [34] (Jackson LJ); [49] (Smith LJ); [50] (Ward LJ).
84 Ibid [46] (Smith LJ).
85 Ibid [46] (Smith LJ). Further, Ward LJ at [55] cited with approval the trial judge’s finding that turning
off the lights failed to add an additional educative or instructive element to the game.
86 Scout Association (n 1) [32].
87 Ibid [46] (Smith LJ).
88 Explanatory Notes to the Compensation Act 2006 [11].
89 Scout Association (n 1) [49].
90 C Witting, ‘The Hand and Shirt tests of breach and the Civil Liability Acts’ (2009) 17 Torts Law
Journal 242, 242–43. The dissenting opinion of Jackson LJ, by affording greater weight to the wider
context when establishing the required standard of care of the scout master, appears more reflective of an
‘aggregate analysis’ of acceptable risk.
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considerations.91 In this instance, a more expansive or ‘aggregate’ inquiry, arguably
encouraged by section 1, is affirmed as being notably uncertain in its application
and effect.92 Paradoxically, despite the scale of the beneficial activities of the wider
Scout Association, section 1 offered little substance in safeguarding the scout
leaders in Scout Association v Barnes. Interestingly, academic commentary has both
endorsed93 and challenged94 Jackson LJ’s minority reasoning.
More critically, as alluded to by Ward LJ, the law of tort appears to be a
particularly blunt instrument in such circumstances, defendant volunteers either
negligent or non-negligent, there being no band of reasonable choices open to
judges.95 If indeed it is not the function of the law of tort to eliminate every iota of
risk or to stamp out socially desirable activities, a principle enshrined in section 1 of
the Act, it is respectfully submitted that an evidential threshold of negligence may
fail to adequately safeguard volunteers in this context. Finely balanced future cases
will likely expose more volunteers to civil litigation and potential negligence
liability.96 In short, it is asserted that although the scout leaders in Scout Association
v Barnes were arguably careless by turning off the main lights, in all the
circumstances, it is contended that such carelessness should not necessarily be
actionable in law.97
Accordingly, a more transparent and effective means of preventing the deterrent
effect on volunteers undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity
might be the adoption of a gross negligence standard in this jurisdiction. Such
statutory provision might more appropriately balance the considerable social utility
of volunteering activities, and the safeguarding of volunteers, with the public’s
legitimate right to seek redress for injury or harm.98 Scout Association v Barnes
highlights the limitations of section 1 in encouraging desirable activities, and more
specifically, fails to reassure well-intentioned and committed volunteers that they
will be protected from (unreasonable) civil liability. In this context, a heightened
evidential threshold of gross negligence appears to have considerable practical
utility,99 arguably more precisely encapsulating and reflecting the general tenor of
section 1,100 it thereby being necessary for volunteers to demonstrate a very high
91 Ibid, 259. Interestingly, s 3 of the SARAH Act is drafted to require courts to consider whether the
defendant’s approach to the activity as a whole, as against a single act or omission in the course of a
particular activity, was predominantly responsible. Nevertheless, it is submitted that Jackson LJ’s
reasoning in Barnes is illustrative of s 1’s scope to achieve this same broader view or aggregative
approach.
92 M Lee, ‘Safety, regulation and Tort: Fault in Context’ (2011) 74(4) Mod L Rev 555, 558.
93 K Lines and J Heshka, ‘Bump in the night’ (2011) 155 Sol Jo (no 2) 8–9.
94 N Tomkins, ‘Liability: personal injury–negligence–games’ (2011) 1 JPI Law C1, C3.
95 Scout Association (n 1) [60] (Ward LJ).
96 E.g., Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials, 27 August 2015 (County Court,
Birmingham).
97 See generally, Walton (n 43) [1–07].
98 See, for example, LRC Ireland (n 77).
99 Ibid [4.81].
100 And more recently, Lord Young’s report, Common Sense Common Safety (n 16) and, the SARAH
Act.
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degree of careless conduct before being legally liable.101 Though found to be legally
negligent, the scout leaders’ conduct was not manifestly or obviously at fault, it
being unlikely to be regarded as amounting to gross negligence.102 Nevertheless,
before turning to a more detailed consideration of potentially restricting the liability
of volunteers for negligent conduct, there is considerable, and somewhat concealed,
merit to section 1 worthy of recognition and further discussion.
Avoidance of the ‘Tomlinson trap’
The ‘Tomlinson trap’, by failing to balance the cost of the preventative measures
and the social value of the activity, against the risk the activity generates, may be
regarded as requiring that a volunteer would be under a duty to do whatever is
necessary to prevent a foreseeable risk of serious injury. At first glance, this may
appear reasonable, an unfamiliarity with the law of negligence likely to discourage
the taking of any foreseeable risks, for instance, by encouraging individuals to
deliver activities as safely as possible. However, taking such unreasonable measures
to prevent negligence liability, by minimising the risk of serious injury to
participants, goes beyond what is reasonable.103 Simply applied, this puts the matter
too high. Problematically, this notion of a heightened standard of care may be
internalised by volunteers since the perceived compensation culture ‘creates a
climate of fear and encourages organisations to attempt to eliminate all risk, even
though this is an unobtainable goal’.104 Although of limited assistance to volunteers
that lack this awareness, ‘[t]he question of whether a person has acted negligently is
not answered simply by analysing what he did or did not do in the circumstances
that prevailed at the time in question and then testing it against an objective standard
of ‘‘reasonable behaviour’’’.105 The social value of the activity giving rise to the risk
also falls to be considered.106
Jackson LJ’s powerful dissenting judgment in Scout Association v Barnes
reiterates and endorses the necessity of this balancing exercise, his Lordship of the
view that Judge Worster, in the County Court, had indeed failed to conduct a
suitable and sufficient Tomlinson inquiry.107 Despite Smith and Ward LJJ not
concurring with this view, such an observation by a distinguished and highly
experienced member of the judiciary is acknowledgement that it remains feasible
for judges at first instance to still succumb to the ‘Tomlinson trap’. In short,
engagement of section 1 of the Act by defendants should necessitate an explicit and
101 See, for example, Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814 [25] (Dyson LJ).
102 See, Nolan (n 6) 663. Nolan argues that a test of manifest or obvious fault may essentially equate to a
gross negligence standard.
103 NJ McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law (4th ed., Pearson, 2012) 31.
104 Lord Young (n 16) 19.
105 Whippey v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 452 [16] (Aikens LJ).
106 Berent v Family Mosaic Housing (incorporating Mosaic Housing Association) [2012] EWCA Civ
961 [20] (Tomlinson LJ).
107 Scout Association (n 1) [30] (Jackson LJ).
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transparent Tomlinson balancing exercise. By raising and reinforcing the importance
of the profile of socially desirable activities, section 1 essentially puts the court on
notice, thereby reducing the possibility of the Tomlinson control mechanism from
being overlooked.108 Accordingly, to ensure that the standard of reasonable care
required of volunteers is set at a realistic and sensible level for the activity
concerned, it is imperative that the social value of that same activity is carefully
considered and accounted for in the court’s judgment. Reassuringly, the emerging
case law appears to indicate that section 1 has indeed added some force to the nature
of Tomlinson inquiries, arguably endorsing this legislative intervention. The Court
of Appeal’s decision to direct a re-trial on the issue of whether the degree of risk
was acceptable in the light of the social value of the game in Uren v Corporate
Leisure (UK) Ltd109 seems to be illustrative of this enhanced profile. Also, following
Scout Association v Barnes, first instance judgments appear to be more mindful of
the need to recognise and explicitly account for the social value of the activity
giving rise to the risk.110 Interestingly, the ramifications of this contemporary
emphasis of the Tomlinson balancing exercise seem to extend beyond the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Act.111 Section 1 certainly appears to have the
scope to function as a control mechanism by essentially heightening the breach
barrier, despite the accompanying Explanatory Notes prepared by the Department
for Constitutional Affairs indicating otherwise.112
The preceding analysis centres on the legal framework in cases of alleged
negligence when section 1 has been engaged. Since it is questionable whether the
implications of such legal judgments are disseminated effectively, the intended and
consequential reassurance afforded from section 1 for persons undertaking func-
tions in connection with a desirable activity is likely to be limited.113 If this is
indeed the case, an instrumental opportunity to raise awareness and educate
individuals about acceptable risk taking, whilst simultaneously discouraging
disproportionate risk-averse behaviour, is being missed. Potentially, effective
dissemination might do much to reassure volunteers. In short, the emerging
jurisprudence generally reveals a more pronounced endorsement and sensitivity of
socially valuable activities by courts. In this context, judicial reasoning appears to
recognise that effective volunteering, for instance sports coaching, is conducted in
108 Although this article will later argue that the SARAH Act 2015 essentially appears to mirror section 1
in this regard, technically speaking, since the SARAH Act is mandatory, there would appear to be an even
greater onus on courts to adopt more of an aggregate analysis of acceptable risk.
109 Uren (n 21).
110 See, for example, Blair-Ford (n 8) [45], [52], [56], [60]; Wilkin-Shaw (n 2) [41]–[46]; Cf Bartlett (n
96). See further, N Partington, ‘‘‘It’s just not cricket’’. Or is it? Bartlett v English Cricket Board
Association of Cricket Officials’ (2016a) 32(1) Professional Negligence 75.
111 McErlean (n 36) [12]. Technically, s 17 of the Act stipulates that s 1 only extends to England and
Wales. Of course, as a matter of application of legal principle, this distinction is purely academic.
Nonetheless, McErlean appears to add force to the submission that s 1 does indeed act as a reminder to
courts.
112 Explanatory Notes to the Compensation Act 2006 [11].
113 See, for example, R Heywood and P Charlish, ‘Schoolmaster tackled hard over rugby incident’
(2007) 15 Tort Law Review 162, 171. Also see, Morris (n 2) 368.
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an environment where the activity is delivered ‘as safe as necessary’, importantly,
distinguished from ‘as safe as possible’, the likelihood of serious injury created by
the activity being outweighed by its benefits.114
Liability of Sports Coaches
The context of sports coaching provides ideal circumstances in which to consider
the potential merits of section 1 and/or adoption a gross negligence standard when
leaders of socially desirable activities are sued in negligence. Integral to
achievement of the London Olympic 2012 legacy of participation and performance
is coaching,115 requiring the support, training and commitment of thousands of
volunteers.116 Most claims brought against sports coaches for sports related injuries
are for negligence,117 with an anticipated increase in such litigation.118 The vast
majority of coaching is delivered by volunteers,119 often with limited training,120
with approximately half of the coaches in this jurisdiction not holding a coaching
qualification.121 Previous experience as players and enthusiasm for the role are often
regarded as sufficient.122 Consequently, since most sporting activities would be
regarded as socially desirable activities,123 section 1 of the Act would likely be
engaged should a volunteer coach be sued in negligence. Similarly, following recent
enactment of the SARAH Act, in determining what was necessary for a sports coach
to meet the applicable standard of care in the circumstances, courts must have
regard to whether:
the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person
was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members;
the person, in carrying out the activity in the course of which the alleged
negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a
114 P Whitlam, Safe Practice in Physical Education and Sport (8th ed., Association for Physical
Education, 2012) 18–20. Also see, House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, Compensation
Culture, Third Report (HC 754–1, 2005) [51].
115 Sports coach UK, ‘Coaches key to a lasting legacy’ (20 July 2012) http://www.sportscoachuk.org/
news/coaches-key-lasting-legacy. Accessed 12 February 2016.
116 D Healey, Sport and the Law (4th ed., UNSW Press, 2009) 166.
117 MJ Mitten, ‘The Coach and the Safety of Athletes: Ethical and Legal Issues’ in RL Simon (ed), The
Ethics of Coaching Sports: Moral, Social, and Legal (Westview Press, 2013) 215, 215–16; N Partington,
‘Sports Coaching and the Law of Negligence: Implications for Coaching Practice’ (2016b) Sports
Coaching Review. Published online 19 May 2016: DOI 10.1080/21640629.2016.1180860.
118 N Partington, ‘Professional liability of amateurs: The context of sports coaching’ (2015) 4 JPI Law
232. As noted by Lyons, the liability of coaches is ‘never far from the news’: M Lyons, ‘Editorial’ (2015)
4 JPI Law 5.
119 Coach Tracking Study: A four-year study of coaching in the UK (sports coach UK, 2012) 17.
120 C Nash, ‘Volunteering in Sports Coaching–A Tayside Study’ in M Graham and M Foley (eds),
Volunteering in Leisure: Marginal or Inclusive? (LSA, 2001) 50.
121 Sports coach UK (n 120) 17.
122 Healey (n 116) 159.
123 Sutton (n 21) [13] (Longmore LJ).
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predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other
interests of others.124
These provisions appear to be a further reiteration of the existing common law
position, and arguably, little more than another restatement of section 1.125 Although
courts must take into account the SARAH Act when considering claims of alleged
negligence, whereas section 1 is framed in discretionary terms, the SARAH Act could
be construed as a not entirely subtle, and more explicit, reframing of section 1’s tacit
invitation to the courts to heighten the breach barrier. If engaged, this may further erode
the test of objective reasonableness. More generally, given the judiciary’s aforemen-
tioned reservations regarding section 1, with the Tomlinson balancing exercise having
only recently been explicitly signposted for the courts, the utility of the SARAH Act in
this context seems questionable. At its highest, the SARAH Act may be regarded as
seeking to crystallise a more ‘aggregate analysis’ of precaution taking. The Government
contends that requiring the court to have regard to whether the person sued
demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety or
other interests of others, represents an actual (albeit ‘modest’) change in the law.126
Nonetheless, adopting a prospective analysis, it appears difficult to ignore the robust
assertion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick during the SARAH Bill’s passage through the
House of Lords, when stating, ‘[t]his Bill is indeed exceptional–not because it is of any
importance but because it is of no importance at all. It is useless’.127 Simply applied, in
safeguarding persons functioning in connection with desirable activities, the SARAH
Act appears to essentially duplicate the previously highlighted predominant benefit of
section 1, namely concentrating the court’s reasoning on wider aspects of the
defendant’s conduct. Indeed, since section 3 will not change the court’s overall
approach,128 it seems difficult to establish how ‘it may be the case that the requirement
to consider this wider context will change the court’s analysis’.129 Significantly, the
Impact Assessment prepared by the Ministry of Justice for scrutiny of the SARAH
Bill,130 failed to evaluate or consider the usefulness of appropriate civil liability
immunity in order to reassure individual volunteers providing and leading activities
which benefit society.131 The Minister of State for Justice, Lord Faulks, subsequently
reaffirmed that ‘the Bill does not seek to confer immunity from civil liability on anyone
124 Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, ss 2 & 3.
125 See further, Partington (n 46).
126 Hansard HL vol 756 col 1573, (4 November 2014) (Lord Faulks) http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/lhan51.pdf. Accessed 31 July 2015.
127 Hansard HL vol 756 col 1549 (4 November 2014).
128 Explanatory Notes to the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, [5].
129 Ministry of Justice, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill: European Convention on Human
Rights memorandum (13 June 2014) [7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-action-
responsibility-and-heroism-bill-european-convention-on-human-rights-memorandum. Accessed 30 July
2015.
130 Ministry of Justice, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill: impact assessment (13 June
2014): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-action-responsibility-and-heroism-bill-
impact-assessment. Accessed 31 July 2015.
131 Arguably, reinforcing Morris’s assertion that the lack of interest in (more extensive) tort reform in the
UK is somewhat inexplicable: see A Morris, ‘‘‘The Compensation Culture’’ and the Politics of Tort’ in
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whose actions fall within its scope’.132 The contended limitations of section 1 in
safeguarding and reassuring sports coaches will, therefore, likely remain problematic.
Accordingly, adopting a comparative law perspective proves particularly
insightful and instructive. For instance, in attempting to ensure that the
appropriate balance is struck between the policy issues and tensions created by
the promotion of involvement in sport and physical activity, against the need to
ensure that performers are not exposed to unreasonable risk taking, some states
in the US have concluded ‘that requiring a standard of care that exceeds
negligence comports with the social desire not to chill vigorous participation in
competitive sports’.133 In the US, the overall trend appears to safeguard and
encourage volunteer coaches by restricting the risk of liability whilst coaching
for mere negligent acts.134 Legislative steps have established that those
providing instruction for certain inherently dangerous activities will not be
exposed to liability unless such instruction is grossly negligent,135 with civil
liability immunity legislation reasoned to address coaches’ and volunteers’ fear
of being sued by its proponents.136
Nonetheless, the UK Government need not look so far afield as North America,
or Australia, for legislation more effectively constructed to address the mischief to
which section 1 is designed to tackle, not least in the context of sports coaching.
Much closer to home, Part 3 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of
2011 in the Republic of Ireland (ROI),137 based on a detailed report produced by the
Law Reform Commission, provides necessary and sufficient civil liability immunity
for volunteers. According to the Law Reform Commission:
[T]he enactment of legislation in this area would be beneficial in that it would
establish clearly the nature and scope of the duty of care and the precautions a
person must take to meet the standard of care required by the law as it stands.
The Commission considers that people who come to the aid of others or who
voluntarily give their time to assist community organisations should be able to
do so with a clear knowledge of the precise scope of any legal liability. The
Commission therefore recommends that the legal duty of care of Good
Samaritans, voluntary rescuers and voluntary service providers, should be set
out in legislation. The Commission also recommends that the legislation
Footnote 131 continued
TT Arvind and J Steele (eds) Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law Statute and the Dynamics of
Legal Change (Hart, 2013) 78.
132 Hansard HL vol 756 col 1547 (4 November 2014).
133 T Davis, ‘Tort Liability of Coaches for Injuries to Professional Athletes: Overcoming Policy and
Doctrinal Barriers’ (2008) 76 UMKC L Rev 571, 575.
134 TR Hurst and JN Knight, ‘Coaches’ liability for athletes’ injuries and deaths’ (2003) 13 Seton Hall J
Sports L 27, 48.
135 R VerSteeg, ‘Negligence in the Air: Safety, Legal Liability, and the Pole Vault’ (2003) 4 Tex Rev Ent
& Sports L 109, 175–76.
136 G Wong, Essentials of Sports Law (4th ed., Praeger, 2010) 127.
137 Inserting a new Part IVA (sections 51A to 51G) into the Civil Liability Act of 1961, applying to
volunteers carrying out activities for the purpose of sport and recreation, with a volunteer not to be
personally liable in negligence for any act done when carrying out voluntary work.
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should take account of the high social utility of Good Samaritan acts and
volunteering activities ….138
In recommending legal liability premised on a gross negligence standard for
individual volunteers the Commission also considered that:
[T]he imposition of a gross negligence test succeeds in striking a balance
between the policy of encouraging altruistic behaviour with the public’s right
to seek redress. With regard to encouraging altruistic behaviour, the leniency
of the gross negligence test may be understood as a reward for good
behaviour. Furthermore, it militates against the deterrent effect that the fear of
litigation may cause. The Commission is of the view that this is an appropriate
approach regarding Good Samaritans and individual volunteers, whether
formal or informal, taking into account the benefits that flow from their
activities and the sacrifices that they have made, from their own pocket and
time, in conferring them. The application of the ordinary negligence test, on
the other hand, would be to impose too heavy a burden that would threaten the
continuation of such benevolent activities.139
Given the serious limitations of section 1 highlighted above, the UK
Government is encouraged to consider following the ROI’s lead in better
safeguarding and protecting volunteers organising and delivering socially
desirable activities. Although the full effectiveness and impact of this excellent
legislative response in the ROI will require due evaluation and review,140 by
developing, extending and refining the existing common law position, it appears to
achieve the aspirations of section 1 without falling foul of the limitations of both
the Compensation Act 2006 and SARAH Act 2015. In the specific circumstances
of sports coaching, this reinforces the requirement for courts to appreciate the
sometimes slender distinction between negligent and non-negligent coaching,141
affording coaches and instructors appropriate latitude and leeway in their
discretionary decision making practices.142 This would ensure that the standard
of care is set at a realistic and sensible level.
In view of the predominant reliance in the UK on volunteer coaches, the
acknowledged benefits to society derived from sporting activities,143 and the UK’s
138 Law Reform Commission of Ireland (n 77) [3.106].
139 Ibid [4.81]. Also see, Nolan (n 6) 653–54.
140 T O’Connor, ‘How the perceived risk of litigation affects the rules of rugby’ LawInSport, 18
December 2013 http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/regulation-a-governance/item/how-the-perceived-
risk-of-litigation-affects-the-rules-of-rugby. Accessed 30 July 2015.
141 MJ Dobberstein, ‘‘‘Give Me the Ball Coach’’: A Scouting Report on the Liability of High Schools and
Coaches for Injuries to High School Pitchers’ Arms’ (2007) 14 Sports Law Journal 49, 69.
142 For instance, Woodbridge School v Chittock [2002] EWCA Civ 915, the Court of Appeal recognising
that acceptable decisions can be made ‘within a reasonable range of options’.
143 For instance, social values, in particular health, social inclusion, education and volunteering. See,
Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting
within the Council, on a European Union Work Plan for Sport for 2011-2014 (OJ C 162, 01/06/2011)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42011Y0601(01)&from=EN. Acces-
sed 5 May 2016.
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unwavering aspiration for continued sporting success,144 it is submitted that the
better safeguarding of volunteer sports coaches may warrant statutory provision
extending beyond the scope of section 1 of the Act and, the corresponding SARAH
Act. Importantly, to address overkill concerns that would likely discourage
volunteers from organising or leading beneficial activities, varying the standard of
care in these special circumstances appears peculiarly appropriate.145 This would
appear to sensibly balance the social value of the activity, and the cost of the
preventative measures, against the risks generated by that same activity, by holding
volunteers legally accountable for a very high degree of carelessness.
Beyond the ‘Tomlinson trap’
If the UK Parliament were to follow other jurisdictions in passing legislation to
reassure and better protect volunteers, by introducing a liability threshold of gross
negligence, this would complement the safeguards provided for by section 1 (and by
definition the existing common law), by bridging the lacuna that might be created
where sports coaches or instructors receive ‘reward’ that goes beyond reasonable
reimbursement for expenses.146 Although paid coaches sued in negligence may not
avail of any statutory provision restricting civil liability for volunteers, the socially
desirable nature of most sporting activities would still concentrate the court’s
attention on the social utility and value of the activity giving rise to the risk and the
cost of the preventative measures. Testing the practical effect of such correlative
provision on the facts of Mountford v Newlands School147 proves particularly
instructive, endorsing the combined effectiveness of section 1 with a gross
negligence standard in this context.
Simply put, in Mountford the schoolmaster in charge of the under-15 Newlands
Manor School rugby team was found to be in breach of a duty of care by selecting
an over-age player, in accordance with the England Rugby Football Schools’ Union
guidelines, who’s subsequent tackle during an inter school seven-a-side match
resulted in a broken elbow for the claimant. For present purposes, this analysis
centres on the legal issues of standard of care and breach.148 Importantly, in
jurisdictions with a gross negligence standard for the civil liability of volunteers,
parents or volunteer coaches organising and leading sporting activities and teams,
without payment, would unlikely be too alarmed by this judgment. Indeed, there
was little suggestion that the teacher had displayed a very high degree of
144 See, for example, J Stone, ‘Tory manifesto pledges more Olympic medals for British athletes’, The
Independent (14 April, 2015, London) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tory-manifesto-
pledges-more-olympic-medals-for-british-athletes-10176474.html. Accessed 11 February 2016.
145 See generally, Nolan (n 6) 686.
146 For instance, Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 (ROI), section 51A (1) (c).
147 [2007] EWCA Civ 21. Although the distinction between schoolmaster and coach may be a material
consideration, for present purposes, this analogous authority is both relevant and informative.
148 For a more detailed critical analysis of this judgment, and particularly the issue of causation, see
Heywood and Charlish (n 113).
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carelessness, a breach of a (less onerous) standard of care by the schoolmaster,
premised on a gross negligence standard, improbable.
The teacher selecting the team (and refereeing the fixture) was employed by
Newlands Manor School, the school ultimately being vicariously liable. Any
potential civil liability immunity for volunteers would have therefore been
inapplicable on the facts of the case. Nonetheless, engagement of section 1 may
be regarded as accounting for this void, since playing rugby is a socially desirable
activity.149 Arguably, the English Court of Appeal should have been more mindful
of the desirable effects of widening participation in Mountford, by on appropriate
occasion,150 allowing coaches to exercise discretion in playing players ‘up/down’
age groups,151 as opposed to interpreting national governing body guidelines
restrictively.152 An enhanced judicial sensitivity and regard for the socially
desirable merits of this specific activity, and importantly, an awareness and
appreciation of the wider implications for competitive games generally,153 and the
development of individuals in particular,154 ought to have been factors of
considerable weight in the court’s reasoning. Problematically, by failing to
expressly recognise the social value of the activity giving rise to the risk, and the
cost of the preventative measures, the Court of Appeal may once again have fallen
into the ‘Tomlinson trap’. Of course, determination of whether the social benefit of
playing this over-age player was such that the degree of risk it entailed was
acceptable would remain a question of fact, degree and judgment, decided on an
individual basis. In the specific circumstances, there was no special reason justifying
selection of the older player, with an interrelated failure by the schoolmaster to
complete a risk assessment or allow the player to play on a trial basis.155
Conversely, since the physical disparity between the over-age player and other
players was not objectionable,156 following Whippey v Jones,157 it could be argued
to have been unreasonable to expect the schoolmaster to contemplate that injury was
likely to follow from his acts or omissions, there not appearing to be a sufficient
probability of injury for him to anticipate it.
Nonetheless, the absence of a Tomlinson balancing exercise would appear to
endorse Jackson LJ’s recognition in Scout Association v Barnes of the rare failure of
some judges to occasionally overlook this fundamental requirement of the tort of
149 Sutton (n 21) [13] (Longmore LJ); Scout Association (n 1) [29] (Jackson LJ).
150 Most notably, where any consequential risk is acceptable.
151 Mountford (n 147) [6] highlighting that there may be ‘educational reasons’ for this flexibility.
Interestingly, following Scout Association (n 1), an ‘educative or instructive element’ clearly intensifies
the desirability of activities: [40], [43] (Smith LJ); [55] (Ward LJ)).
152 Heywood and Charlish (n 113) 171.
153 Uren (n 32) [195] (Foskett J).
154 Heywood and Charlish (n 113) 171.
155 Mountford (n 147) [7], [9], [10].
156 Ibid [10].
157 Whippey (n 105).
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negligence. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight,158 and in light of the potential
(overkill) ramifications of the court’s decision for teachers and coaches, it would
have been entirely sensible, particularly following the same court’s awareness of
wider implications in Vowles v Evans,159 to directly confront such possible
anxiety.160 A more explicit and transparent Tomlinson inquiry would certainly have
been beneficial in Mountford, demanding consideration and acknowledgement of
the important broader context. Accordingly, the contemporary application of
section 1, and corresponding pronounced profile attributed to Tomlinson inquiries,
should be of some reassurance to both volunteer and paid sports coaches delivering
socially valuable activities in the UK.
Conclusion
Should the alternative view that section 1 affords an enhanced level of protection
and safeguarding for individuals undertaking functions in connection with a
desirable activity be accepted, the nebulous nature of the law of negligence is
nonetheless likely to remain a hindrance in reassuring volunteers. Whilst
minimising the danger of courts succumbing to the ‘Tomlinson trap’, section 1
does not appear to go far enough, the idiosyncratic judicial sensitivity and
tenderness afforded to socially desirable activities a significant obstacle to
challenging perceptions concerning exposure to litigation risk. Application of tort
law principles is particularly problematic in circumstances whereby there might be a
narrow distinction between negligent and non-negligent conduct, with no band of
reasonable choices open to judges. This article’s critical consideration of the
essentially limited scope of section 1, should a volunteer sports coach be sued in
negligence, appears to support the practical utility of a heightened evidential
threshold of gross negligence. Arguably, this might more effectively reflect the
general tenor of section 1, and the SARAH Act, by substantively addressing
misperceptions and excessive risk aversion. In short, if indeed it is not the function
of the law of tort to eliminate every iota of risk or to stamp out socially desirable
activities, much might be gained by the UK Parliament following the ROI’s lead in
better safeguarding and protecting volunteers organising and delivering socially
desirable activities through enactment of civil liability immunity legislation.
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158 It always being easy to be wise after the event: Overseas Tankship v Morts Docks & Engineering Co
Ltd (Wagon Mound No 1) [1961] AC 388, 424; see generally, Walton (n 43) [7.49].
159 [2003] 1 WLR 1607 [49] (Lord Phillips MR). Similarly, see Anderson (n 20) [149]–[150] (Foskett J).
160 To be fair to their Lordships, unlike in Vowles, Mountford was not argued in such terms.
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